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Comment
AN INTERMEDIATE NATIONAL APPELLATE COURT:
SOLUTION OR DIVERSION?
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of federal court cases in the last few decades has lately
directed a great deal of attention toward the feasibility and desirability of
creating a new intermediate national appellate court. Structural revision has
not, however, been the sole means suggested to accommodate rising
caseloads.
In 1959, due to the sharp increase in district court filings, the late Chief
Justice Earl Warren instigated a study by the American Law Institute (ALI)
of the jurisdiction of state and federal courts.' Although the Study of the
Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts (ALI Jurisdic-
tional Study) took the form of a legislative proposal when it was published
in 1968, Congress failed to act favorably on the proposals embodied therein
which would have affected the jurisdiction of all the federal courts.2 Already
overburdened federal courts faced mounting caseloads at all levels, but the
problem seemed most acute in the Supreme Court. The nature of the Court
and its role as the last resort of all Americans regardless of status, left little
room for administrative innovations which might alleviate the Justices'
burden. As a result of these circumstances, in 1971 Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger established a committee to study and report upon the case load of the
Supreme Court.
3
The Study Group on the Case Load of the Supreme Court (Freund
Committee), chaired by Professor Paul A. Freund,4 released a report 5 which
stated that the Court's docket is greatly overburdened. 6 The principal
remedy suggested to relieve the Court's burden was the creation of an
intermediate appellate court which would screen all cases filed for Supreme
Court review, and decide many of those cases which involve issues upon
which the circuit courts were in conflict.
7
The initial negative response to this recommendation 8 prompted Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger to issue an invitation for more constructive
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS iX (1968). See note 152 and accompanying text infra.
2. For an extensive analysis of the ALI proposal, see Currie, The Federal Courts
and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1968).
3. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE
LOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT ix (1972) [hereinafter cited as FREUND REPORT].
4. Paul A. Freund was the Carl M. Loeb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
5. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3.
6. Id. at 9.
7. Id. at 18.
8. See Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L.
REv. 473 (1973); Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253
(1973); Poe, Schmidt & Whalen, A National Court of Appeals: A Dissenting View, 67
Nw. U.L. REV. 842 (1973); Warren, Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice
Burger Defends Freund Study Group's Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721,
724-30 (1973). (1022)
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criticism and alternative solutions.9 A wealth of material containing both
alternative structures for a new court and criticisms of the various proposals
has been published in reaction to the Chief Justice's challenge.10
Part Two of this comment will detail the major structural proposals for a
National Court of Appeals. Criticism of each proposal is included in order to
trace the development of the controversy concerning such a tribunal and to
enable the reader to better understand why particular variations were
advocated in subsequent proposals.
Although the proposals which are collected in this comment deal with
restructuring the federal court system, such remedies can be meaningfully
evaluated only in conjunction with the threshold question of whether
structural revision is indeed warranted. There is almost universal agreement
that the federal courts are presently overburdened." However, there is less
agreement as to how the situation might best be corrected.
In part, these differeng approaches are attributable to the initial
perspective taken. While the Freund Committee dealt with the excessive
burden currently being shouldered by the Supreme Court Justices and thus
devised a plan designed to relieve the Court of its heavy screening burden,12
the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska
Commission) - formed by Congress in 1972 to study the federal court
system - focused upon the need for additional national appellate capacity
and thus framed a proposal which would increase the capacity for
nationally binding precedent.' 3 Taking a different approach, one distin-
guished federal judge 4 viewed the problem as pervading the federal courts
9. Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch - 1973,59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1129
(1973). The Chief Justice stated:
Few have challenged the existence of a grave problem, and now it is the plain
duty of the profession to explore all possible avenues of solution. Sterile, negative
criticism is of little use to anyone, and it is the obligation of those who disagree
with the solutions proposed to offer their own alternatives.
Id.
10. Numerous articles have dealt with this issue. See Alsup, A Policy Assessment
of the National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1313 (1974); Black, The National
Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 YALE L.J. 883 (1974); Casper & Posner, A
Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (1974); Friendly,
Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634 (1974); Griswold,
Rationing Justice - The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the Court Does Not Do,
60 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (1975); Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal
Cases in the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 604-07, 612-13
(1974); Hufstedler, Courtship and Other Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A.J. 545 (1974); Kurland,
Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Time For a Change?, 59 CORNELL L.
REv. 616 (1974); Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the
Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 576 (1974); Stokes, National Court of
Appeals: An Alternate Proposal, 60 A.B.A.J. 179 (1974); Warren, Let's Not Weaken the
Supreme Court, 60 A.B.A.J. 677 (1974).
11. See notes 17-26, 41-50, 59-67 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 17-26 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 59-67 and accompanying text infra.
14. Henry J. Friendly, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second
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at all levels and has thus suggested jurisdictional modifications aimed at
alleviating the caseload on all levels.'5
Since the extent of the problem has been demonstrated, and since each
individual proposal has been subjected to criticism by a host of scholars,'
6
Part III of this comment will focus upon identifying the true character of the
problem with which the federal court system is beset.
II. A NATIONAL COURT OF APPEALS: VARIOUS PROPOSALS
A. The Freund Committee Proposal: Starting Point
Believing that "[t]he bare figures of the Court's workload present the
problem most vividly,"' 7 the Freund Committee relied primarily upon raw
statistical data'" as the basis for its conclusion that the Supreme Court's
docket has reached "the saturation point."' 9 Over the twenty year period
ending with the 1971 term, the number of cases filed in the Supreme Court
tripled to 3,643 and over one-half of these were indigents' petitions;2
° the
backlog of cases rose from 146 to 864;21 and, since the number of cases
argued before the Court remained relatively constant, the percentage of
petitions for certiorari which were granted fell from 11.1% in 1951 to 5.8% in
1971.22
Population growth, legislative enactments opening new areas to
litigation, and changes in constitutional doctrines were among the factors
found to have contributed to the increased filings. 23 The Freund Committee
15. See notes 145-51 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 37-54, 88-101, 124-29, 133-37 and accompanying text infra.
17. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
18. See id. at A1-A14 app.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 2-3. The numbers of both in forma pauperis (IFP) and paid petitions
filed over the period were us follows:






Id. Thus, while the number of paid petitions was about two and one-half times greater
in 1971 than in 1971 than in 1951, the number of in forma pauperis petitions grew
almost fourfold.
21. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3 at 2.
22. Id. at 3-4. Erwin N. Griswold has explained that in the Court's 1973 term
"there were approximately 150 oral arguments, and this number has been more or less
constant for a number of years. It is, in fact, the maximum number that the Court can
be expected to hear on the merits." Griswold, supra note 10, at 340.
23. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. "Civil Rights, environmental, safety,
consumer, and other social and economic legislation" were cited as recent illustrations
of legislative enactments. Id. Along with reapportionment and school desegregation
doctrines, the expanded substantive rights of criminal defendants and their greater
access to counsel were cited as examples of areas in which constitutional
interpretations contributed to the rising caseload of the federal courts. Id. at 2-3. The
reasons behind the growth in criminal cases was more fully considered by Professors
Gerhard Casper and Richard Posner of the University of Chicago Law School. G.
CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 35-43 (1976). After an
extensive analysis of the Supreme Court's criminal docket, the professors were unable
[VOL. 221024
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reported that two undesirable consequences resulted from this mounting
caseload: "[First], [i]ssues that would have been decided on the merits a
generation ago are passed over by the Court today; and second, the
consideration given to the cases actually decided on the merits is
compromised by the pressures of 'processing' the inflated docket of petitions
and appeals. '2 4 Since the study group found little likelihood that the
caseload would diminish,25 swift relief was recommended to enable the Court
to meet its responsibilities effectively.
26
The major proposal advanced in the Report of the Study Group on the
Case Load of the Supreme Court (Freund Report) called for the "creation of
a National Court of Appeals which would screen all petitions for review now
filed in the Supreme Court, and hear and decide on the merits many cases of
conflicts between circuits. '27 The new court would be expected to deny most
of the petitions, certify several hundred cases to the Supreme Court each
term, and decide on the merits those cases which involved actual conflicts
between the circuit courts of appeals. 28 If a case involved a conflict deemed
sufficiently important to warrant a decision by the Supreme Court, it would
be included among the certified cases. 29 Both denials of certiorari and
to definitively attribute its growth to the major Warren Court decisions in the area. Id.
at 42. One particularly puzzling factor was the enormous increase in appeals by
criminal defendants in federal cases, since the recent decisions by the Warren Court
had merely extended to defendants in state criminal cases those rights which had
long been enjoyed by defendants in federal cases. See id. at 35-41. Professors Casper
and Posner theorized that the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970),
which provided appellate representation for federal defendants, may partially explain
the increase. G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra at 41-42. They noted, however, that the
act does not explain the rise in paid cases on the criminal docket. Id. at 42.
Notwithstanding their doubts concerning the effect of liberal Supreme Court decisions
upon the aggregate caseload, the professors did find that the composition of the cases
on the Court's criminal docket tended toward areas expanded by the Warren Court,
and thus may have been affected by decisions concerning the rights of criminal
defendants. Id. at 43. In any case, Professors Casper and Posner concurred with the
finding of the Freund Committee that factors internal to the system - changes in the
law - contributed to the caseload growth. Id. at 56.
24. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.
25. Id. at 3. The history of ever increasing litigation led the Committee to project
that "independent of other factors, the number of cases will continue to increase as
population grows and the economy expands." Id. For a different interpretation of the
situation, see text accompanying notes 45-49 infra.
26. The need for additional nationally binding precedent was illustrated as
follows:
There has been a proliferation of federal regulatory and welfare legislation in
recent years, legislation that requires interpretation, that produces conflicting
judicial decisions, and that frequently raises constitutional problems. There is no
basis to foresee anything but an intensification of this trend in the period ahead,
and with a larger and active bar, increasing legal assistance, and the possibility
of an increase in the number of federal judicial circuits, the prospects of a still
further increase in the number of review-worthy cases reaching the Court cannot
be gainsaid.
FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.
27. Id. at 18.
28. Id. The proposed new court would only have jurisdiction to decide those issues
upon which the circuit courts were divided. Id. at 21.
29. Id. In cases of "serious doubt, the National Court of Appeals should certify a
petition rather than [deny] review." Id. The Freund Committee estimated that
approximately 400 cases would be certified to the Supreme Court each year. Id.
1976-1977] 1025
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decisions on the merits by the new tribunal would be final and unreview-
able.30 As the Report stated:
Once a case had been certified to it, the Supreme Court would, as
now, have full discretion to grant or deny review or limited review, to
reverse or affirm without argument, or to hear the case. In cases of
conflict among circuits, the Supreme Court would, in addition, be able to
grant review and remand to the National Court of Appeals with an
order that the case be heard and adjudicated.
31
Additionally, the Supreme Court would be supplied with copies of all
petitions filed in the new court and could preempt the jurisdiction of the new
court by requiring that a particular case be certified to the Supreme Court
either before a decision denying review had been made or prior to judgment
when the National Court of Appeals was considering the case on the
merits.
32
The composition and method of selecting the bench of any new court is
also an important concern. The Freund Committee proposed a bench for the
National Court of Appeals consisting of seven judges borrowed from the
circuit courts of appeals for staggered three-year terms. 3 3 After omitting
from consideration certain senior judges and those who had served for less
than five years at the appellate level, 34 selection for the new tribunal would
operate automatically by alternating between the most and the least senior
judges in active service nationwide.3 5 No two judges from the same circuit
would serve together, nor would anyone serve a second term until all eligible
judges had served once.
36
Although criticism of the Freund Committee's proposal was almost
universal, the particular faults found with it varied. There were three major
lines of attack. First, several commentators asserted that there was no need
to lighten the Supreme Court's workload. 37 Second, many others argued that
the proposed solution would not have the desired effect of substantially
alleviating the Court's burden.38 Finally, as some fault was found with the
30. Id.
31. Id. at 22. A remand to the National Court of Appeals would indicate that,
despite the existence of a conflict among the circuit courts of appeals, the case did not
warrant a Supreme Court decision. Id.; see notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
32. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at 21. "The expectation would be that exercise
of this power would be exceptional." Id.
33. Id. at 18-19.
34. Id. at 19. After a list of all active circuit court judges had been compiled, the
following would be deleted as ineligible: "judges serving as chief judges, or who would
have succeeded to a chief judgeship during their term of service on the National Court
of Appeals had they been selected, and all judges with less than five years service as
United States circuit judges." Id.
35. Id. Judges would, however, be permitted to decline appointment to the new
court "for good cause." Id.
36. Id.
37. See notes 41-49 and accompanying text infra.
38. The scheme devised by the Freund Committee was labeled inadequate to
alleviate the Supreme Court's workload because the 400 or so cases certified to the
Court would presumably include the marginal cases which presently consume most of
1026 [VOL. 22
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responsibilities assigned to the new court,3 9 the most serious criticism
focused upon the likelihood that the scheme would damage the Supreme
Court as an institution.
40
Prominent among those who denied that the Supreme Court was
overburdened were the late Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and
former Justices Douglas and Goldberg. 41 The late Chief Justice Warren
contended that the burden was not as great as the statistics seemed to
indicate since in forma pauperis petitions, which accounted for a large
amount of the increase in requests for review,42 tended to be clearly without
merit and, therefore, required minimal time to screen. 43 Justice Brennan
agreed, noting that after gaining experience in dealing with petitions for
certiorari a "substantial percentage" of them can be disposed of merely by
reading the questions presented, some of which are "clearly frivolous." 44
At least partial support for the position taken by these Justices is found
in the work of Professors Casper and Posner, who criticized the Freund
Committee's statistical analysis as inadequate:
[A] simple aggregate of all of the applications for review filed each year
may disguise important changes in the composition of the caseload
that affect the actual workload of the Court and the likelihood that the
caseload will continue to grow in the future at the same rate as in the
past.
4 5
By comparing the civil cases docketed in the 1956-1958 terms with those in
the 1971-1973 terms, Professors Casper and Posner determined that
although there were a number of categories which experienced substantial
growth, there were also many areas in which the number of filings either
declined or rose only marginally. 46 This uneven growth among the various
categories led them to conclude that factors internal to the legal system,
the time spent by the Justices in screening petitions. See G. CASPER & R. POSNER,
supra note 23, at 95. See also Alsup, supra note 10, at 1328-32; Brennan, supra note 8,
at 476-78, 482.
39. The limited responsibilities of the new court have evoked the caution that "it
would be demeaning for judges accustomed to judging to be nothing more than
'Glorified Law Clerks.'" Alsup, supra note 10, at 1337-38, quoting Warren, supra note
8, at 729. Moreover, the short tenure of judges appointed to the new court could cause
the decisions concerning certiorari to be rather haphazard and unfortunate since the
judges, in dealing with the petitions, would never acquire the "feel" that is gained by
experience. See Warren, supra note 8, at 728.
40. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text infra.
41. See Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 174-78 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Brennan, supra note 8, at 476-79; Goldberg, One Supreme Court, New
Republic, Feb. 10, 1973, at 14-15. Warren, supra note 8, at 726-27.
42. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
43. Warren, supra note 8, at 726.
44. Brennan, supra note 8, at 477-78. Justice Brennan cited the following as
examples of "clearly frivolous" questions: "'Are Negroes in fact Indians and therefore
entitled to Indians' exemptions from federal income taxes?' 'Are the federal income
tax laws unconstitutional insofar as they do not provide a deduction for depletion of
the human body?' 'Is the 16th Amendment unconstitutional as violative of the 14th
Amendment?'" Id.
45. G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 7 (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at 51-55.
COMMENT 1027
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rather than external concerns such as population and economic activity,
were primarily responsible for the burgeoning caseload. 47 However, they
were unable to controvert the Freund Committee's projection that the
number of petitions for Supreme Court review would continue to rise, and
admitted that their findings could support a conclusion that the Supreme
Court was already overburdened. 48 Nevertheless, they emphasized that the
statistics did "not compel acceptance of''49 a belief that measures must be
taken to reduce the Court's workload.
Despite the few commentators who questioned the burdens of the
Court's workload, the large majority of authorities conceded that the Court
was overworked.5° Their primary concern, however, was that a national
court in the form envisioned by the Freund Committee would impinge upon
the effective functioning of the Supreme Court.51 There appears to be
widespread agreement that the Supreme Court alone should have the
authority to choose from among the petitions seeking review those cases
which it believes are worthy of full consideration. 5 As Professor Kurland53
has stated:
The essence of the complaint against the Freund Report is that
somehow it threatens to reduce the powers that have been exercised by
the Supreme Court. The notion is that by delegating to other judges the
selection of the four hundred and fifty-odd petitions for Supreme Court
consideration, the Court will be turned from its libertarian bent, that it
will be deprived of its opportunities to amend earlier positions, and that
it will lose the opportunity for self-education in the highways and
byways of the law, an education it is supposed to get from reading all
the thousands of petitions that are now assigned to it. The chief
argument, however, is that the power totally to choose among the cases
proffered should not be delegated. 5
4
47. Id. at 56.
48. Id. at 61.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. See generally COMMISSION ON Revision of the FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE
SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 9
& 172-88 app. (1975) [hereinafter cited as HRUSKA REPORT] Burger, Retired Chief
Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger Defends Freund Study Group's
Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721, 724 (1973); Rehnquist, Whither the
Courts, 60 A.B.A.J. 787-787 (1974).
51. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
52. See Alsup, supra note 10, at 1332-35; Black, supra note 10, at 888-91;
Gressman, supra note 8, at 254-57; Griswold, supra note 10, at 337; Hufstedler, supra
note 10, at 547; Warren, supra note 8, at 728-30.
53. Philip B. Kurland is the William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor in the college, and
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
54. Kurland, supra note 10, at 627. The late Chief Justice Warren shared this
apprehension that delegation of the screening function would foreclose opportunities
for innovation necessary to the formulation of constitutional law. He explained:
Many of the Court's great cases involving the Bill of Rights first came to [the
Supreme Court] in the form of traditional lower court opinions that gave no hint
of the Court's possible concern. In many instances, no one could anticipate that
the justices would perceive in those cases the chance to advance the meaning and
the application of some aspect of the Bill of Rights.
Warren, supra note 8, at 729; accord, Black, supra note 10,' at 888. The importance
attributed to the power to select cases is probably attributable to a common notion
that everyone, regardless of wealth or status is entitled to address the Supreme Court.
[VOL. 221028
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These criticisms may have sounded the death knell for the national
appellate court advocated in the Freund Report, 55 but they also brought
forth a number of alternative plans for an intermediate national appellate
court, each aimed at alleviating the burden on the federal appellate court
system while cautiously avoiding the criticism encountered by the Freund
proposal.
B. Alternatives Still on the Table: Meeting the "Need for
Definitive Declaration of the National Law"
Despite minor variations in a few specific elements of their recommen-
dations, Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler,56 Dean Erwin N. Griswold,5 7 and the
Hruska Commission, submitted substantially similar proposals for a new
court. In formulating their proposals, they were less concerned than the
Freund Committee had been with reducing the work of the Supreme Court.
Rather, they tried "to determine whether the need for definitive declaration
of the national law in all its facets is being met, and, if it is not being met,
how best to assure that it will be met."
58
1. Recommendation of the Hruska Commission
The Hruska Commission was formed by Congress in 1972 to study the
various problems encountered by the federal court system.59 The commis-
sion's report included a sampling of issues upon which the circuit courts of
appeals were in conflict6° and projected that the number of conflicts per year
during the Court's 1971-1973 terms would range between forty-five and fifty-
five, "the equivalent of about one-third of the number of cases given plenary
consideration each term." l Additionally, the commission found that
although federal regulatory laws which often require judicial interpretation
had increased in both number and importance, the Supreme Court's docket
55. See G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 23, at xii & 94; Friendly, supra note
10, at 636; Haynsworth, supra note 10, at 612-13.
56. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
57. Attorney, Washington, D.C.; former Solicitor General of the United States
(1967-73); Dean of Harvard Law School (1964-67).
58. HRusKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 9-10; accord, Griswold, supra note 10, at
339; Hufstedler, supra note 10, at 546-47.
59. See Hruska, The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System: A Legislative History, 1974 ARIz. ST. L. J. 579, 579, 594 & n.87.
60. HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 76-90. The Hruska Commission listed
twenty specific points on which there were conflicting federal court decisions which
had not been resolved by the Supreme Court. Id. The illustrations were meant to show
the advantage of transfer jurisdiction in a newly created court which "would result in
a nationally binding decision at the first level of review." Id. at 78. See text
accompanying note 69 infra.
61. HRUsKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 17. Professor Floyd Feeney of the
University of California at Davis developed the projections after studying a large
sample of petitions for review filed during the Court's 1971 and 1972 terms. Id.
Refuting the suggestion that many of the conflicts were of a constitutional nature
which should be left unresolved until "ripe for definitive adjudication," id., the
commission explained that less than one-half of the conflicts concerned constitutional
matters. Moreover, the commission further asserted that constitutional conflicts were
the ones most likely to be quickly resolved. Id.
COMMENT 1029
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had shifted in the opposite direction: prior to 1960, less than one-third of the
Court's holdings rested upon constitutional grounds; thereafter, well over
one-half of the decisions rendered concerned matters of constitutional law. 62
Relying on both this fact and "[t]he perceptions of participants in the federal
judicial system," 63 the Hruska Commission determined that the paucity of
nationally binding decisions often bred uncertainty,6" forum shopping,65 and
relitigation of issues previously decided in a different circuit.66 The views of
those consulted by the Hruska Commission were found to "reflect
deficiencies which we view as both serious and remediable. They underlie
our conclusion that a need for additional national appellate capacity has
been demonstrated and that, consistent with the mandate of the Congress,
we should recommend a change in structure to meet that need.
'67
62. Id. at 8.
63. Id. at 10. Those consulted by the commission included the Supreme Court
Justices, judges, litigants, and members of the federal agencies. Id. at 10-13, 26-27 &
133-68. The commission also noted Dean Griswold's claim that during the six years
in which he was Solicitor General, he felt obliged to deny agency requests to petition
the Supreme Court for review in at least twenty cases per term due to the Court's
workload. Id. at 12, quoting Griswold, supra note 10, at 344.
64. HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 14. The Commission explained this facet of
the problem as follows:
[T]he lack of capacity for definitive declaration of the national law frequently
results in uncertainty even though a conflict never develops. The possibility of
conflict, not knowing whether a potential conflict will mature into an actual
conflict, is yet another consequence of our present system. In many cases there
are years of uncertainty during which hundreds, sometimes thousands, of
individuals are left in doubt as to what rule will be applied to their transactions.
Id. at 14.
65. Id. at 15. Forum shopping was found to be particularly evident in the field of
patent law where "'mad and undignified races'" to invoke the jurisdiction of a
particular federal court ensue. Id., quoting H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW 155 (1973).
66. HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 133-43. The federal government has been
known to relitigate matters in different circuits in the hope of a more favorable ruling.
See id.
67. Id. at 27. Professors Casper and Posner took issue with the Hruska
Commission's finding that there is a need for additional national appellate capacity.
After revealing that they found only about half as many unresolved conflicts per term
as had the Commission, they discounted the importance of any short term statistics,
G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 89-90. In their view, a study should focus
upon discerning a trend rather than the collection of a few years' statistics. Id. at 90.
Comparing the figures compiled on the 1958-1960 terms with those recorded on the
1971-1973 period, the professors found that the number of conflicts per term remained
relatively constant, as did the number of conflict cases decided by the Supreme Court.
Id. at 87-89. The average number of alleged conflicts rose modestly from 273 to 407.
Id. at 87. The number of conflicts which the deciding court acknowledged to entail
conflicting decisions changed slightly from 47 to 50. Id. at 89. In the earlier period, the
Supreme Court accepted about 74% of the conflicts found to exist by the research
assistants, and 67% were heard by the Court in the more recent time period studied.
Id.
However, the Hruska Commission itself had recognized that it is preferable to
postpone the final adjudication of some issues until several courts have addressed the
question; yet the statistics offered in support of the conclusion that too many conflicts
went unresolved each year did not take into account such justifiable delay. HRUSKA
REPORT, supra note 50, at 14-15. The commission's own figures showed that
approximately one-half of the constitutional questions and one-fifth of the remaining
issues in which conflicts wnre found had been resolved by the Supreme Court within a
1030 [VOL. 22
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Specifically, the Hruska Commission recommended that Congress enact
legislation creating a National Court of Appeals which would consist of
seven life-tenure judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. 68 The new tribunal would have two types of jurisdiction: 1) reference
jurisdiction to hear cases referred to it by the Supreme Court; and, 2)
transfer jurisdiction to decide cases transferred to it from the circuit courts
of appeals, the Court of Claims, and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals.69 The plan would allow the Supreme Court to choose among four
alternatives in disposing of petitions for review: 1) the Court could grant
review and proceed to hear and decide the case; 2) it could simply deny
review and terminate the litigation; 3) in denying review the Court could
refer the case to the new tribunal for a decision on the merits, and 4) the
petition for certiorari could be referred to the National Court of Appeals
which would be at liberty either to hear and decide the case or to deny
review and terminate the litigation. 0 Cases could be transferred to the new
national court from the various other federal appellate courts if they
involved conflicting interpretations of federal law, recurring factual
situations upon which swift national precedent would be desirable, or issues
which, although previously addressed by the National Court of Appeals,
continued to present perplexing questions of interpretation or application.
71
The National Court of Appeals could refuse to accept jurisdiction over any
case transferred from another court. 72 The decision to refuse a case within
its transfer jurisdiction would be final and unreviewable.7 3 However, any
few years. Id. at 17. Thus, the number of conflicts per term did not reflect the number
of cases that the Supreme Court should have decided but for workload constraints;
rather, a large percentage of such issues were apparently passed over because they
were not yet ripe for definitive resolution. See G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 23,
at 90-91.
Professors Casper and Posner also criticized the Hruska Commission for
disregarding the opinions of leading litigators who did not perceive any "problems of
unsettled issues, conflicts, or undue delays in the areas of practice in which they
specialize." Id. at 91, citing HRusKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 144-68 app. The
Hruska Commission had merely appended to the report the views of those who saw no
problems of nationally binding precedent while emphasizing, in the body of its report,
the points made by those who supported the need for a new court. See HRUSKA
REPORT, supra, note 50, at 10-13 & 144-68 app.
68. HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 30.
69. Id. at 32, 34.
70. Id. at 32-33. The four options would only be available for cases within the
Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction. Id. If the case were one in which the
appellant had a statutory right to appeal, the Court would be required either to grant
review and render a decision on the merits or to refer the case to the National Court of
Appeals for full consideration. Id. at 33.
71. Id. at 34-35. The commission explained:
[Tihe regional courts would be expected to give appropriate weight to the need for
allowing difficult issues to mature, and to take account of the benefits to be
gained from allowing the lower courts to consider a variety of approaches to
difficult legal problems before a nationally binding decision is reached.
Id. at 36.
72. Id. at 35.
73. Id. Except for the new court's authority to refuse to accept a case which had
been transferred, any decision by a regional court of appeals upon a motion for
transfer would be unreviewable. Id.
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decision on the merits by the new court would be subject to discretionary
review by the Supreme Court.
74
Apparently due to stiff opposition,75 the concept of transfer jurisdiction
was not included in the proposals suggested by Judge Hufstedler and Dean
Griswold.76 It was also not embodied in the pending Senate bill introduced
by Senator Hruska. 77 That bill, if enacted, would create a National Court of
Appeals to decide only cases referred to it by the Supreme Court.
7 8
2. The Hufstedler and Griswold Variations
The scheme outlined by Judge Hufstedler, which has been adopted by
the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice and approved by the American
Bar Association's House of Delegates, 79 differs from the Hruska Commis-
sion's recommendation in a number of details. This court would be composed
of fifteen, rather than seven, members to be selected from among the active
federal appellate judges who would sit in panels of five or seven.' ° While the
precise means of selecting judges for the bench of the new court was not
specified, Judge Hufstedler stated that she preferred a systematic selection
designed to preclude "dominance by any administration or political
74. Id. at 38-39. Although the Commission believed that few cases within the
reference jurisdiction of the National Court of Appeals would be re-argued in the
Supreme Court, it suggested that "expedited consideration" should be given to any
case granted review under such circumstances. Id. at 39.
75. Senator Hruska listed the following opposition to the concept of transfer
jurisdiction:
Justices of the Supreme Court, with one exception, either ignored the provision or
opposed it. Witnesses at a series of hearings termed the proposal either
impracticable or undesirable or both. Finally, the American Bar Association,
acting through its House of Delegates on the recommendation of its Special
Committee on Coordination of Judicial Improvements, while warmly endorsing
the proposal for establishing a National Court of Appeals, withheld approval of
the provisions . . .concerning transfer jurisdiction ...
122 CONG. REc. S 6986 (daily ed. May 12, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). For the
views of the Supreme Court Justices, see Hruska Report, supra note 50, at 172-88.
76. Compare Hufstedler, supra note 10, at 548 and Griswold, supra note 10, at
350-51 with HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 32-38.
77. S.3423, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S 6987 (daily ed. May 12, 1976).
78. On December 10, 1975, Senator Hruska introduced a bill in the United States
Senate which embodied the recommendation for the creation of a new national court
which was made by the Hruska Commission. 121 CONG. REC. S21583-84 (daily ed.
Dec. 10, 1975) (remarks of Senator Hruska). This bill, S.2762, included the
Commission's proposals that the court's judges be appointed by the president and
that the court have both reference and transfer jurisdiction. Id. at S21584. The bill
which Senator Hruska introduced on May 12, 1976, S.3423, differed from S.2762 only
in two respects; namely, the manner of appointment of the new court's judges and the
omission of the court's transfer jurisdiction. 122 CONG. REC. S6985-86 (daily ed. May
12, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). The scheme for selection of judges for the new
tribunal proposed in S.3423 provided for two judges to be appointed by the President
immediately, two more to be appointed four years later and the remaining three to be
appointed after eight years had passed from the initial selection. Id. at S 6987. The
court would initially achieve a seven-member bench by a process which would
automatically place the most senior circuit court judges (after excluding those who
would reach senior status during their four-year term) on the court. Id.
79. See 60 A.B.A.J. 546 (1974).
80. Hufstedler, supra note 10, at 548.
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party.""' Congress would be free to establish the jurisdictional parameters of
the new intermediate court, and the Supreme Court would determine which
cases would actually be referred to it.82 All decisions of the National Court of
Appeals, would, under this plan, be filed with the Supreme Court and
become final only if the Supreme Court failed to exercise its prerogative to
take jurisdiction over the case within a specified time period. 83
Although he would call the new tribunal the "National Court of the
United States, '8 4 Dean Griswold's variation, in comparison to the Huf-
stedler proposal, was closer to the Hruska Commission's recommendation.
Dean Griswold anticipated that most cases referred to the national court
would involve specialized areas of administrative law;8 5 however, to avoid
unnecessary jurisdictional problems, he did not favor statutory restriction of
the new court's jurisdiction, as was recommended by Judge Hufstedler.8 6
While admitting that it may seem undesirable to have the entire original
bench - of five or seven judges - appointed by one President, Dean




Although most commentators addressed specific proposals, their
criticisms should be considered in connection with any proposal for an
intermediate court with reference jurisdiction. In a spirited attack upon
those proposals which would create a new court with jurisdiction to hear
cases referred to it by the Supreme Court, the late Chief Justice Warren
raised the question of whether such delegation of the Court's jurisdiction
would be constitutional.8 He argued that "the determination as to what
court shall exercise jurisdiction over certain classes of litigation is often a
highly charged political question" which should be left to Congress. s Te
late Chief Justice also doubted the wisdom of those proposals which would
create a tribunal consisting of judges who would neither be chosen on the
basis of competence, nor permanently appointed °
81. Id. For possible selection methods, see notes 34-36, 78 and accompanying text
supra.
82. Hufstedler, supra note 10, at 548.
83. Id.
84. Griswold, supra note 10, at 350.
85. Id. at 351. Griswold remarked: "The cases which would go to the National
Court of the United States would presumably include most tax cases, many patent
and antitrust cases, some diversity cases, NLRB cases, and some Power Commission
and Trade Commission cases, among others." Id.
86. Id. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
87. Id. at 350, 352. Dean Griswold thought, however, that some of the original
appointees should be "relatively senior judges already on the bench of the courts of
appeals." Id. at 352.
88. Warren, supra note 10, at 679. The late Chief Justice explained: "[T]here is a
serious question whether Congress has the constitutional power once it has vested
certain appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, to delegate or authorize the
delegation of any part of the jurisdiction to an inferior court." Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.; accord, Friendly, supra note 10, at 654.
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A significant criticism directed against the proposal which provided
that decisions would become final only when the Supreme Court failed to act
upon them was that, unless every decision by the National Court of Appeals
were to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, 91 the Court's imprimatur would
be placed upon decisions in which it had played no part.92 Not all of the
proposals for reference jurisdiction would be subject to this criticism,
however. The recommendation of the Hruska Commission, for example,
provided for the same type of discretionary Supreme Court review by writ of
certiorari as is presently used to review appellate court cases. 93 Furthermore,
even if the Supreme Court's role were one of passive acceptance, the cases
referred to the new tribunal by the Supreme Court would be of only
secondary importance and rarely worthy of reconsideration after judgment
had been entered by the National Court of Appeals.94
Although the Hruska Commission operated under a self-imposed
constraint that it could not advocate a plan which would add to the Supreme
Court's workload, 95 the reference jurisdiction proposal has been criticized for
doing just that.9 The Court's responsibility to refer cases to the new tribunal
would obviously add to its present burden and could substantially increase
the time spent on screening cases to decide whether to refer cases to the
National Court of Appeals and, if so, whether to require the new tribunal to
dispose of the case on its merits.97
91. See G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 107-08; Friendly, supra note 10,
at 653-54. Judge Friendly explained the problem as follows:
One of two consequences would follow: either the Court would have to take a
larger proportion of these decisions than it now does of decisions of courts of
appeals in the same area of law, or the "national law" would be established by a
rotating group of judges without the prestige and, particularly if selected on an
automatic basis, of distinctly less ability than the Justices of the Supreme Court.
Id. at 654.
92. See Warren, supra note 10, at 679. Elaborating on the point, the late Chief
Justice stated: "The Supreme Court would be expected to take the responsibility for
final judgments entered in its name without having fully participated in the essential
processes that precede the judgments. The very vitals of the Court's decisional
processes will have been cut away." Id.
93. See note 74 and accompanying text supra. The bill presently pending in the
Senate also calls for review by writ of certiorari. See S.3423, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., 122
CONG. REC. S 6987 (daily ed. May 12, 1976).
94. See Griswold, supra note 10, at 351.
95. HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 9.
96. See G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 105-06. See also Warren, supra
note 10, at 678.
97. For the options available to the Supreme Court under the recommendation of
the Hruska Commission, see note 70 and accompanying text supra. As an example of
the added considerations which would come into play, Professors Casper and Posner
explained that
a Justice might regularly vote to deny certiorari in a class of cases because he
believed the majority would not resolve the issue in a satisfactory manner. For
him a "rational" reference decision might require a prediction of the likely
outcome in the national court. The screening function would thus assume greater
importance, which would make it more difficult to discharge and therefore more
time consuming.
G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 106. Perhaps this example illustrates the
late Chief Justice Warren's apprehension that "the court would be thrown into the
political arena." Warren, supra note 10, at 679. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
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Unlike the Freund Committee's proposal, the recommendation of the
Hruska Commission has not, as yet, generated broad-based opposition.98 As
Senator Hruska stated:
[N]ot a single voice from among the active Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court has doubted that reference jurisdiction is feasible nor has any
voice asserted that it would impose added burdens on the court. On the
contrary, it stands endorsed as a feasible, practicable mechanism, one
which would make it possible for the National Court of Appeals to
achieve those benefits for which it was designed.99
Of course, Senator Hruska's optimistic assessment of the reaction to the
proposal ignored the criticisms sounded by the late Chief Justice Warren"1°
and other commentators. 01
C. More Proposals: Miscellanea
Although a proposed National Court of Appeals with jurisdiction to hear
cases referred to it by the Supreme Court is presently the focal point of
discussion, other schemes have also been advanced, none of which has
generated much enthusiasm or support.
1. The Rosenberg Plan: A Hodgepodge of Alternatives
An extensive and somewhat radical plan to restructure the federal
appellate court system was proposed by Professor Rosenberg. 0 2 His
"Flexible Model"' 0 3 called for a merger of all the federal appellate courts into
a single "Court of Appeals of the United States."'1 The newly titled court
would have four separate divisions, three of which - the Circuit Division,
the Claims Division, and the Custom and Patents Division - would
essentially carry on as had their predecessors with the single modification of
realigned circuits within the Circuit Division. 05 The fourth division - the
Central Division - would be carved into four distinct sections.106 A Section
for Criminal Appeals would be charged with the responsibility of ensuring
that the federally protected rights of criminal defendants were not
violated. 0 7 It would hear cases on appeal from the highest state courts and
the federal appellate courts in the Circuit Division. 0 8 A Section for National
98. For a discussion of the reaction to the FREUND REPORT, see notes 37-55 and
accompanying text supra.
99. 122 CONG. REc. S6986 (daily ed. May 12, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Hruska).
100. See notes 88-90 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 91-97 and accompanying text supra.
102. Maurice Rosenberg is the Harold R. Medina Professor of Procedural
Jurisprudence, Columbia University.
103. Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 591-95.
104. Id. at 591-92.
105. Id. at 592.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The effectiveness of this chamber would require that legislation be passed
which would preclude relitigation of "issues previously heard or disclaimed in an
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Law Specialties would be created to hear all cases within certain areas of
federal specialty law. 1"1' Congress would list the areas of federal specialty
law which could be delegated to this division by the Supreme Court,110 and
the Court would specify from time to time those areas over which the
division's jurisdiction would actually extend."' Cases would reach this
panel by direct appeal from a district court or an administrative agency, and
the section's decisions would be "recommended" to the Supreme Court,
becoming final absent action by the Court within 60 days.' 2 A Section for
Certiorari Review would prepare brief memoranda recommending whether
certiorari should be granted or denied by the Supreme Court.'1 3 Again, the
recommendations would be accepted unless the Court acted within a
specified time period."14 The final section of the Central Division would
decide individual cases referred to it by the Supreme Court."15 Presumably,
referrals would consist of "cases the Justices believe[d] need[ed] a
preliminary decision to be made by the Central Division and transmitted to
the Supreme Court with a recommendation."'"16 Professor Rosenberg
considered this fourth section to be of "only marginal utility compared to the
other three chambers."' 17
2. A Separate Criminal Court: Proposed and Rejected
Professor Rosenberg's proposed Section for Criminal Appeals is similar
to Judge Haynsworth's suggestion that there be "a new national court of
appeals to review [criminal] convictions in the federal and state judicial
systems."" 8 Judge Haynsworth asserted that such a court would substitute
"an efficient system for prompt direct review" for the present system which
relies upon "collateral review of federal questions arising in criminal
prosecutions.""' 9 Under his proposal, the new court would additionally be
109. Id. at 593.
110. Id. Professor Rosenberg illustrated the selection procedure as follows: "The
categories will be drawn from a Chinese-menu style list, prepared by Congress and
naming such federal specialties as labor relations, social security, environmental
protection, antitrust, or whatever fields the Supreme Court regards as most in need of
unifying, harmonizing decisions." Id.
111. Id. Professor Rosenberg explained this to be "the essence of the concept of
planned flexibility. The Supreme Court has its hand on the throttle or the valve -
determining when classes of cases or particular functions shall flow into and out of
the Central Division." Id. at 593-94.
112. Id. at 593 (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 594.
114. Id. A losing litigant would be permitted to respond to a recommended denial
of certiorari; however, the Supreme Court could promulgate rules to require that
motions for a rehearing be very brief. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. Since the Rosenberg Proposal is merely a hodgepodge of several more
narrow proposals, the criticisms which have been leveled against the other suggested
measures apply equally to the broad scheme advanced by Professor Rosenberg. For
the applicable criticisms, see notes 37-54, 88-92 and accompanying text supra and
notes 124-29, 133-36 and accompanying text infra.
118. Haynsworth, supra note 10, at 598. Clement F. Haynsworth, Judge, United
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"authorized to hear and decide cases referred to it for decision by the
Supreme Court. ' 120 This nationwide supervision over criminal convictions
and prisoners' complaints would, in Judge Haynsworth's view, assure
uniformity in the application of constitutional standards. 121 Moreover, by
precluding the use of habeas corpus in cases in which there either was or
could have been an appeal to the new national criminal court, collateral
attacks would be curtailed. 122 Judge Haynsworth suggested that review by
the Supreme Court should be allowed only when the National Court of
Criminal Appeals "disposed of a case on the merits or denied certiorari with
one or more dissents."'
23
The Freund Committee had considered and rejected the idea of a
separate court to handle criminal matters, 124 primarily because it foresaw a
likely polarization of constitutional views among judges serving on such a
specialized court.125 Further, the new tier of appellate review would not
lighten the Supreme Court's burden unless its decisions were unreviewable
and this was seen as inexcusable discrimination against criminal defend-
ants. 26 Judge Friendly cautioned that if provision were made for Supreme
Court review as Judge Haynsworth had proposed, "there would be no
general agreement that the Supreme Court was right and the National Court
was wrong" in cases of reversal by a sharply divided Supreme Court. 2 This
would have a detrimental impact upon the effectiveness of both tribunals.
28
Judge Friendly's chief argument against the Haynsworth proposal,
however, was that the problems generated by collateral attack on criminal
convictions could be better solved by legislation which is in the offing.
29
120. Id. Concerning the new court's jurisdiction by reference from the Supreme
Court, Judge Haynsworth merely explained that "[t]he most likely category of such
referenced cases would be those involving conflicts in statutory interpretation or
decisional law which should be resolved for the sake of uniformity and predictability
in the law." Id. at 605.
121. Id. at 604.
122. Id. at 606. See also Haynsworth, A New Court To Improve the Administration
of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841, 843-44 (1973). The utility of a new criminal court may
have diminished due to recent Supreme Court decisions which have tended to reduce
the availability of collateral review of criminal convictions. See Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976).
123. Haynsworth, supra note 10, at 613.
124. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
125. Id.; accord, Freund, A National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1306
(1974); Friendly, supra note 10, at 639.
126. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at 12; accord, Freund supra note 125, at 1306.
127. Friendly, supra note 10, at 639.
128. See id. at 639-40.
129. Id. at 636-37. Judge Friendly noted that bills had been introduced in Congress
which would restrict the availability of collateral attacks, and expressed confidence
that a bill being prepared by the Special Committee on Habeas Corpus of the Judicial
Conference would adequately deal with the problem. Id. He concluded: "There is thus
every reason to think that, at long last, collateral attack on criminal convictions is on
the way to solution by well-considered legislation addressed directly to the problem,
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3. A Court of Administrative Appeals
A national court similar to Professor Rosenberg's suggested Section for
National Law Specialties' 30 - but with more permanently set jurisdictional
parameters - might be helpful both to unify regulatory law'3 and to
alleviate the burden on the circuit courts of appeals.' 32 While recognizing
that such a court might prove to be a worthwhile reform, the Freund
Committee dismissed consideration of such a proposal because of the
negligible impact it would have upon the Supreme Court's workload.133 A
tribunal of this nature has also not been accorded serious consideration due
to widespread antipathy toward specialized courts.'34 It is felt that a
specialized court would lose the general perspective achieved with diver-
sity,' 3 and appointments to its bench would possibly be politicized by
intense pressures from lobbies with narrow interests.136 These criticisms,
however, are directed toward specialized courts whose jurisdiction is
severely limited in scope. They are inapposite in evaluating the desirability
of a national court of administrative appeals whose docket would consist of
a wide range of diversified topics. If there were but a single court, rather
than a court for each of a number of regulatory areas, the chances of
politicization would be no greater than with any other proposed national
court.
1 3 7
III. Is A NEW NATIONAL COURT THE SOLUTION?
The intense controversy precipitated by the Freund Report heightened
awareness of the fact that relief for the federal court system must be prompt
to be effective. However, the remedy suggested by the Freund Committee
and by those whose recommendations are set out above illustrate but one
approach available in solving the problem. The Hruska Commission noted
that "there are two alternative approaches to alleviating the burdens of the
federal appellate system. One seeks to accommodate rising caseloads by
providing the courts of appeals with the means of disposing of greater
130. See notes 109-12 and accompanying text supra.
131. See generally HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 8. The Commission noted,
however, that "the problem of inadequate appellate capacity is not limited to one or
two areas of the law." Id. at 30.
132. This would only be if the new court, as Professor Rosenberg suggested, were to
hear appeals directly from the district courts and administrative agencies. See text
accompanying note 112 supra.
133. FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-12.
134. See HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 28-29; FREUND REPORT, supra note 3,
at 11-12; Alsup, supra note 10, at 1342; Griswold, supra note 10, at 337; Hufstedler,
supra note 10, at 547. See also Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The
Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A.J. 425 (1951).
135. See HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 28; FREUND REPORT, supra note 3, at
11; Rifkind, supra note 134, at 425.
136. See HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 29.
137. Justice Marshall has suggested that federal regulatory law could be
harmonized without creating a new national court by assigning appeals from the
decisions of each administrative agency to only one circuit court. Id. at 183 app. This
is presently the case with some Federal Communications Commission decisions,
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numbers of cases. The other seeks to reduce the caseloads themselves."'138
However, a congressional directive restricted the commission's inquiry to
the first alternative of increasing the decisional capacity of the federal
courts. 39 The Hruska Report stated:
We take note of the number of witnesses who, mindful of our
mandate, nevertheless urged that our task was made more difficult by
the unambiguous limitation thus imposed. Yet, it would be wrong to
leave the impression that limitations on trial court jurisdiction are in
themselves likely to prove an adequate remedy for appellate problems,
particularly in the light of the modest reach of pending legislation.
Unless change is far more sweeping than can now be foreseen, the net
effect is likely to be little more than to slow or to stop the rate of growth.
At the least, it would appear unwise, for planning purposes, to act on the
assumption that the caseload will diminish or even that it will cease to
grow. We should rather plan to provide the courts of appeals with a
measure of flexibility adequate to accommodate whatever additional
demands upon them may be considered wise. It would be intolerable if
proposals sound on their merits had to be rejected solely for lack of
capacity in the system. 4
0
Perhaps the Hruska Commission's projection of the future caseloads in
the federal courts will prove to be accurate. 141 However, the creation of a new
national court can hardly be considered "a measure of flexibility." Rather, it
is a substitute for the pleas for more federal judges and additional federal
circuit courts which have been made for years.142 Even if such a court were
established, however, the calls for more judges and new circuits would be
likely to continue since the federal courts are overburdened at all levels. The
problem is not merely one of excessive work in the Supreme Court - the
aspect addressed by the Freund Committee143 - nor is it ne of insufficient
nationally binding decisional law as Judge Hufstedler, Dean Griswold and
the Hruska Commission believed. 44
Rather than concentrating upon structural revisions at the top of the
court system, perhaps jurisdictional revisions such as those recommended
by The American Law InstituteI45 and Judge Friendly 146 should be the focal
point for discussion. 147 Among the more important suggestions made by
138. HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 2.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2-3.
141. For a similar projection by the Freund Committee, see notes 25-26 and
accompanying text supra.
142. See HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 55-65; Burger, Chief Justice Burger
Calls for Action on Several Proposals, 61 A.B.A.J. 303 (1975); Friendly, supra note 10,
at 648-49.
143. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
144. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
145. See note 152 and accompanying text infra.
146. Friendly, supra note 10, at 640-46.
147. Although the full impact of the modifications advocated by Judge Friendly
have not been measured, it has been estimated that circuit court filings would be
reduced by approximately one-third. Id. at 645; see H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973).
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Judge Friendly were the elimination'of diversity jurisdiction,' 4 fewer federal
criminal sanctions where states- have concurrent jurisdiction,'4 9 more
effective use of administrative agencies for fact-finding and enforcement,'50
and the creation of new courts for patent and tax cases so that.these issues
may be removed from the other federal courts.'
5'
The ALI Jurisdictional Study included recommendations concerning
almost all aspects of federal court jurisdiction, including diversity and
federal question jurisdiction, and provisions dealing with three judge courts,
removal, and the issuance of stays by both federal and state courts.15 2
Current jurisdictional revision suggestions which would affect all levels
of the federal court system are too intricate and extensive to be considered in
this comment. In evaluating the best means to correct the deficiencies of the
148. Id. at 640-41; accord, Burger supra note 9 at 1126. There has been a great deal
of discussion concerning diversity jurisdiction and other aspects of the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. See generally Hearings on S.1876 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,;supra note 1 at:-1-4, 9-23 &-99-161; P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1050-59 (2d ed., 1973); H. FRIENDLY,
supra note 147; Burdick, Diversity Jurisdiction Under the American Law Institute
Proposals: Its Purpose and Its Effect on State and Federal Courts, 48 N. DAK. L. REV.
1 (1971); Currie, supra note 2;, Horowitz, Towards a Federal Common Law of Choice of
Law, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1191 (1967); Marbury, Why Should We Limit Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction?, 46 A.B.A.J. 379 (1960); Moore & Wechstein, Diversity
Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1964); Wright, Restructur-
ing Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Proposals, 26 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 185 (1969). The proposals for improving the federal court system which resulted
from such discussion should be considered in conjunction with those which advocate
the creation of a new tribunal.
149. Friendly, supra note 10, at 641-42.
150. Id. at 642, 644-45. Judge Friendly specifically recommended that orders of the
National Labor Relations Board be made self enforcing. Id. at 644-45.
151. Id. at 643-44.
152. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 1. The ALI Jurisdictional Study
found "that diversity jurisdiction continues to serve an important function in our
federal system, but that it presently extends to classes of cases with no valid
justification for being in the national courts and omits some that should have access
to a federal forum." Id. at 1-2. Thus, the study found that the "basic principle" of
diversity jurisdiction
is to assure a high level of justice to the traveler or visitor from another state;
when a person's involvement with a state is such to eliminate any real risk of
prejudice against him as a stranger and to make it unreasonable to heed any
objection he might make to the quality of its judicial system, he should not be
permitted to choose a federal forum, but should be required to litigate in the courts
of the state.
Id. at 2.
Governed by the belief "that federal question jurisdiction is necessary to
preserve uniformity in federal law and to protect litigants relying on federal law from
the danger that state courts will not properly apply that law," id. at 4, the study
recommended an expansion of federal question jurisdiction.
The other recommendations found in the ALI Jurisdictional Study were
meant "to clarify the jurisdictional lines rather than to alter them," id. at 5, and "to
achieve both a more rational and a more clearly stated allocation of jurisdiction
between state and federal courts." Id. at 5-6.
The study made no attempt to ascertain the effect which these proposals
would have upon the federal courts but added that the added litigation in state courts
"would not add noticeably to the burdens of those courts." Id. at 6.
1040 [VOL. 22
19
White: An Intermediate National Appellate Court: Solution or Diversion
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977
1976-1977]O
federal court system, however, jurisdictional modifications should be
considered in conjunction with structural revision. It seems clear that,
although a new court would not completely alleviate the overwhelming
burden being shouldered by those presently sitting in the district and circuit
courts, jurisdictional modification would affect the flow of cases into all
levels of the system. Thus, since jurisdictional revisions are likely to be
required whether or not a National Court of Appeals is created, they should
be implemented prior to a decision to establish a new tribunal.
At the time of the Hruska Commission hearings, Justice Marshall noted
that "when the enthusiasm for reform catches on, it often appears short-
sighted and timid to recommend limited and modest forms of relief.. . . [A]
few well-placed changes in jurisdictional statutes would serve us all a lot
better than wholesale revision of the federal court system."153 The proposals
for a new court - wholesale revision - have focused attention upon the
problems which confront the federal court system. They are valuable and
should remain on the table, but not one should be enacted until the caution
sounded by Justice Marshall has been heeded.
Stephen C. White
153. HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 50, at 183 app.
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